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The Shape of Things

THE GERMANS ARE GRADUALLY CLOSING IN on Sevastopol but are paying a huge price for every inch gained. Their hope of celebrating the first anniversary of the invasion of Russia by capturing this key city was blasted by the stubborn and gallant resistance of the Soviet garrison and civilian population. But we cannot assume that Sevastopol will hold out indefinitely. Nor should we underestimate its strategic importance. It is one of the chief outer bastions of the Caucasus and its fall might well give the signal for the all-out offensive which Hitler must soon launch if he is to break through the Russian lines this summer. Soviet leaders continue to stress the urgent necessity of a second front and both American and British spokesmen continue to promise an invasion of the Continent. But will the decision be made in time? In his speech at Madison Square Garden Ambassador Litvinov pointed out that one favorable moment—at the close of the Russian winter when the Red Army still held the initiative—had been allowed to slip. Another opportunity may arise, however, in the near future, if Hitler commits his still intact reserves to a drive for the Caucasus. The United Nations must then act and act swiftly, for they cannot hope to win by always leaving to the enemy the choice of a battlefield. It is not necessary to think in terms of an invading army strong enough to drive the Germans out of France and the Low Countries this summer. The purpose of diverting the full German strength from the eastern front would be served by the establishment of a powerfully held bridgehead across the Channel.

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THE POSITION IN THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS remains doubly obscured—by bad weather on the spot and by the fog of censorship in Washington. The latest report is that the Japanese have occupied Kiska, some 650 miles from Dutch Harbor, where attacks have been delivered by United States flyers against enemy naval vessels and transports. Unofficial comments from Washington suggest that Japanese operations in the neighborhood of Alaska are not regarded as very important by the army and navy. An off-the-record military opinion quoted in the *New York Times* was to the effect that

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should the Japanese build up their forces in the Aleutian area, it might become worth while for an American task-force to undertake an expedition to dislodge them. The same experts expressed the view that this would not be a difficult job. The mere layman is left wondering whether it might not be better to throw out the Japanese before they have had a chance to settle down. We cannot safely assume that the Japanese sortie into the far north is no more than a nuisance raid or an extended reconnaissance. Bases at Attu and Kiska would become of great strategic importance should Japan attack Siberia, for they would imperil our communications with the Soviet forces. On the other hand, the desultory shelling of points on the British Columbia and Oregon coasts was, we suspect, a demonstration intended not so much to cause damage to property as damage to morale. The raids seem to have been taken calmly by those on the spot, and we hope they will not be allowed to serve the enemy's purpose by diverting attention from our real line of coastal defense, which lies far to the west and north.

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THE FALL OF TOBRUK SEEMS LIKELY TO touch off a new political crisis in Britain. It is doubtful, however, if it will end in anything more than another reshuffle of ministers which will in no way allay the rising tide of public anxiety and discontent. In an article on page 737 Tom Wintringham tells how the common man in Britain, feeling that the present Parliamentary set-up fails to give adequate expression to his desire to fight the war on an all-out basis, is groping toward new means of making himself heard. The last general election in Britain took place in the fall of 1935 at a moment when the Tory government of the day was making a show of enforcing sanctions against Italy and won many votes by paying lip-service to collective security. The House of Commons then elected was not a truly representative body and in the seven years that have elapsed it has fallen still further behind public opinion. Since the war a party truce has been in operation and the many vacancies that have occurred have been filled by nominees of the party machines. Now the stagnant political waters are being stirred by the challenge of independents. Mr. Wintringham mentions the most remarkable victory won by an independent candidate—the by-election at Wallasey. This town is a lower middle-class suburb of Liverpool, the kind of constituency which the Tories have always considered the equivalent of a pocket borough. Yet it was captured by an independent standing on a left-wing platform which called for socialist measures in order to win the war and organize the peace. There was no class issue here, for the belief that vested interests are obstructing the war effort has become widespread among all classes. A general election in Britain today, if it were possible to hold one, would produce some startling results.

THE STATEMENTS ISSUED BY GANDHI AND Nehru urging an immediate British evacuation of India have created some concern lest the Indian leaders take steps which will weaken British defenses against the still acute Japanese menace to India. Anxiety has been aroused particularly by Gandhi's threat to make "a move which will be felt by the entire world" if the British do not withdraw. But against the negative interpretation of the statements issued by the two leaders following their conference at Wardha must be placed Nehru's forthright denunciation of Japan and the Axis powers and Gandhi's letter to Chiang Kai-shek advocating effective resistance to Japan and the Axis powers. Nehru made it clear that he did not expect the British and American troops now in India to pack up and leave the country at the mercy of the Japanese. What both leaders appear to want is an unequivocal recognition of India's status as an equal in the family of nations, and assurance that it will be allowed to work out its own destiny after the war. It is to be hoped that the British can put aside the irritation and resentment which many of them naturally feel as a result of the failure of the Cripps mission and make an attempt to meet India's request, in principle at least. The stakes are high. The recognition of an independent India would make the war in Asia what it is in Europe—a clear-cut fight against tyranny and oppression.

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HOPE THAT ARGENTINA'S PRESIDENT ORTIZ might return to office and reverse the pro-Axis policy of Acting President Castillo faded when Dr. Castroviejo, the New York eye specialist, sailed for home without performing an operation to restore the President's sight. Whether he recommended one or not is still uncertain. There are rumors of differences of opinion between him and his Argentine colleagues which may have a political background. Meanwhile, there is scant hope that Castillo will modify his policies, despite widespread opposition to them. The Nazi note expressing "lively regret" at the sinking of an Argentine tanker two months ago appears to have been accepted without question. On the other hand the Argentine government has declared that it would not seek immunity from the blockade since such a course would be "contrary to the principles of continental solidarity." But to make certain that new incidents will not arise as a result of the blockade, Argentine vessels have been instructed to call at New Orleans instead of New York. The efforts of the majority group in the Chamber of Deputies to force a debate on the government's foreign policy failed when Foreign Minister Guñazú refused to make a report with stenographers present. The Chamber, in three votes, insisted on keeping a record, and finally took the position that no explanation was worth listening to that could not be made available to the public. There seems little doubt that Argentine public opinion has hardened against the

Axis in recent weeks as a result of Mexico's entry into the war and the stronger stand being taken in Brazil, but so far the only outcome has been a strengthening of Castillo's repressive measures.

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PROSPECTS FOR A SATISFACTORY TAX BILL were improved last week by two important Administration victories in the House Ways and Means Committee. After shelving the Treasury's request for a wartime ceiling on incomes, the committee made an abrupt about-face and followed the Treasury's recommendation in rejecting a sales tax and adopting, by a small margin, a modified proposal for collecting the income tax at the source. Although the committee's action does not bar an effort to reintroduce the sales tax on the floor of the House, there is every reason to believe that the decision will stand. With elections only about four months off, few members of the House will wish to have their names listed in a roll call as favoring such a levy. Objections to the withholding tax should be overcome at least in part by the committee's decision to make half of next year's deductions applicable to an individual's 1942 taxes, thus spreading the transition burden over two years instead of one. Although the committee's tax bill is better than it seemed likely to be a few weeks ago, it still falls short by some \$2 billion of the goal set by the Treasury. There seems to be little chance that the House will close this gap, but it is possible that the Senate, which is not so election conscious, may recognize the necessity of finding additional revenues as a means of holding off inflation.

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IF THE NEW YORK PARTY MACHINES HAVE their way in the primaries, this year's contest for the governorship will be between John J. Bennett, Jr. and Thomas E. Dewey, leaving the voters a pretty choice in mediocrities. Jim Farley's boy Bennett, although for twelve years Attorney General of New York State, is a completely anonymous politician who keeps his views on public questions strictly to himself. His impressive record as a vote-getter must be ascribed to his high standing with the professionals and the difficulty of antagonizing anyone by silence. Mr. Dewey is a horse of another color and one more noted for flashy starts than for staying power. He is as loquacious as Mr. Bennett is taciturn but it is just as hard to know where he stands, for in his eagerness to be all things to all men he is apt to cancel one statement by the next. Despite his strength with the machine, Mr. Dewey has not the indorsement of Mr. Willkie and cannot count on active support of the latter's still large following. With Democratic and Republican forces in the state fairly evenly matched, the balance of power is probably held by the American Labor Party, but this power is difficult to exercise unless one of the major parties can be persuaded to nominate a candidate

acceptable to labor. Rejecting both Bennett and Dewey, the A. L. P. is talking about nominating a candidate of its own, but the objection to this course is that it would almost certainly make the election a gift to the Republicans. One powerful voice has yet to be heard—that of the President. Since the nomination and election of Mr. Bennett would mean in effect that Jim Farley would control the New York delegation at the 1944 convention, Mr. Roosevelt can hardly regard his candidacy with enthusiasm and may well be looking for an opportunity to push forward a compromise candidate with a definitely liberal record.

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GOVERNOR DARDEN OF VIRGINIA IS TO BE congratulated for his fair-mindedness in granting a fifth reprieve to Odell Waller so that the Negro share-cropper might receive a hearing on his plea for clemency. It would be a travesty of justice if Waller were executed because of a technicality. The Supreme Court has held that it is unable to review the case because Waller's attorney failed to take the proper steps to prove his contention that the jury was chosen from a panel from which non-payers of the Virginia poll tax had been systematically excluded. Meanwhile a petition has been sent to President Roosevelt asking him to intervene by appointing a commission of inquiry, as President Wilson did in the cases of Tom Mooney and Joe Hill. We urge our readers to reinforce this petition by sending telegrams or letters to the President; for if Governor Darden does not commute Waller's death sentence, Presidential intervention offers the only hope of delaying execution and opening the way for a reconsideration of the basic issues of race and class raised by the Waller case.

Tobruk and the Second Front

(An Imaginary Monologue by F. D. R.)

WHAT I'm going to say, Winston, may sound hard and ungracious. Perhaps you'll think I shouldn't say anything. We came in late, and then only because we were pushed. And so far we haven't won any real victories. We thought, I too, that we might stick to the business of production and let you fellows do the killing—and the dying. Not because we are afraid or bad fighters, but because—well, no country wants to get into a bloody war even on the right side unless its interests are clearly, directly engaged. Britain didn't want to either, if you'll remember.

That's by way of apology, just to make it clear that I know we are in a poor position to give advice. Bataan was useful, but a useful defeat is a good deal less than a victory. The Coral Sea and Midway battles were useful,

too, and might be rated as victories, but they were defensive actions at best and a defensive victory is a good deal less than an offensive.

But just the same, I must speak my mind, Winston, about the war—the war and Britain. I must say what I think about China—Tobruk—Sevastopol. And what I say will be unpleasant for you as well as for me.

Those three places—a great diversified front, a desert garrison, an ancient fortified port—those places are keys to Allied victory or final defeat. You British and we Americans are jointly responsible for the desperate position of China. We armed Japan instead of cutting off its war supplies years ago. And since Japan turned on us we have failed to use or safeguard or reinforce China—though China is worth all our Far Eastern forces put together. Now China is isolated, cut off from supplies, and the Japanese are seizing, one by one, the bases in China from which we could attack Japan. Not only that. If China is conquered the whole back-side of Russia will be open to invasion. We must not forget that China has been defending Russia as well as the West.

For the betrayal of China before Pearl Harbor, you and we share responsibility, Winston. Perhaps ours is the heavier. For the abandonment of China after Pearl Harbor and its present peril, you are chiefly to blame, if I may say so. The conduct of the British command in Singapore, in Malaya as a whole, and then in Burma was a disaster. And a large part of the fault lay in your refusal to look upon the Chinese, not to mention the native population, as fighting equals. Your policy in India didn't help, either, and it may yet lead to new disasters.

Then Tobruk. Whatever the commentators think up to say, Winston, you and I know that we have suffered a terrible defeat in Libya. Of course there's a good British army in Egypt, and it will fight, and Rommel may be stopped in his tracks. But he may not be stopped. We know that, too. His *Afrika Korps* threatens Egypt; and if Egypt and the Canal are conquered the Middle East is gone. There's nothing beyond Cairo to stop Rommel. Not the French and British forces in Syria. Not the other Allied contingents scattered through the neighboring countries. And then if the Germans succeed in their drive on the Caucasus. . . . But that comes later.

What I want to say about Tobruk is just this, Winston. After all the explanations of the defeat are read and digested one solid—and most indigestible—fact remains: the British under Auchinleck and Ritchie were outmaneuvered and outfought.

Tobruk was another Singapore, another Burma. The best German tanks, the Mark IV's, were better than the best British tanks, our American General Grants. The best German anti-tank artillery, the mobile 88 mm. guns, are better than the best British guns. This is a reason for defeat. But is it an excuse? Laboriously and successfully the British supplied themselves with adequate air equip-

ment—except for dive bombers. But not with tanks, not with guns. Why? Is it to be taken as a law of nature that the Germans will always have better weapons?

Then, too, it is said that the fate of Tobruk was sealed when a large British armored column was caught between two enemy formations near Bir Bellefa and wiped out. And Rommel, it seems, cut off Tobruk's line of retreat by sending contingents ahead toward Egypt and then wheeling north to the coast and severing the line between Tobruk and the border. And, besides, he moved too fast. Nobody at Tobruk expected him so soon. There are a lot of other reasons pouring in over the wires, Winston, but none is more reassuring than the next. Whether Tobruk's defenders were inadequately equipped or surprised or just inefficient—the result is the same. Tobruk fell; and the whole Middle East is in danger.

One by one the strongholds fall. First Europe—all of it, practically speaking. Then Asia—most of it, with more defeats to come. Now North Africa. And nothing, Winston, nothing of any importance has been won back. Except in Russia.

Russia alone knows how to fight Hitler. I say this with no wish to hurt you, Winston, more than ourselves. It is a simple fact to be verified not only on the maps but in a dozen other ways. The Russians, for all their mistakes, knew what fighting the Axis meant in its full unvarnished horror. They knew it meant not only every man but every woman and boy and girl. They knew it meant not only as much of the nation's productive capacity as was convenient to put to war use, but all of it that was not absolutely needed for civilian maintenance. They haven't any cartels to deal with in Russia, Winston, nor coal-owners and shipmasters. Russian workers have made no bargains because no one stands to gain by their sacrifices—no one but their country, which is themselves. They know how to fight to kill; they are ready to die—to the last villager, and even the last officer. They know how to starve and to freeze. They know how to destroy everything they have built. They know how to retreat and then turn swiftly to attack.

The Russian strategy, Winston, has been both bolder and suppler than yours and ours. It has been as good as the German strategy. Today the Russian army is our army—our one best fighting force in the war against Hitler. Is it too much to say that its defeat would be ours?

I am not going to argue that the Russian front is more important than the Far Eastern or the Mediterranean fronts. Each is part of the next. A major defeat in any one might well mean the loss of the others.

The problem is not which one to safeguard. The problem is to find the strategy which offers the best hope of winning the war. Naturally, you say. But if we grant that, and grant, too, that armed men and supplies and ships are limited, we must stand ready to throw that strength into any theater that seems to offer the best

hope of taking back the offensive. For only when we take the offensive shall we find ourselves in a position to win.

What I am getting to, Winston, is this: If the war is to be won, Russia must not be given material help alone but must be relieved. Russia cannot win by itself. It is being pressed now beyond its immense power to fight back. The defeat in Libya inclines you to turn your eyes to the Middle East and propose reinforcement of the British positions there. And here is where I take issue with you. Libya is 12,000 miles from its sources of supply unless you risk ferrying goods through the Mediterranean. It will take three months—two, at the lowest—to throw new American supplies into North Africa. But the issue in Egypt may well be decided between now and then. Rommel cannot be expected to halt his advance just to oblige the British.

No, Winston, we must look at the whole picture and plan more boldly. It is being said that the defeat in Libya has postponed indefinitely any serious consideration of a second front in Europe. I should like to put forward just the opposite contention: The defeat in Libya makes immediate consideration of a second front in Europe absolutely essential. An invasion of the Continent offers the one possibility of drawing substantial German forces from the Russian front. Even Hitler has too few men and machines to fight in full strength on several fronts at once. A second front in Europe might save the Middle East.

I know the objections. They are many. The shortage of shipping is first among them, now that we have sufficient men and materials in the British Isles. But let me remind you that for the first time since the war began the R. A. F. commands the air over the Channel and can protect convoys on the short journey to the French coast. Even more remote European shores are nearer and safer to reach than North Africa. And a ship can carry eighteen or twenty loads of men and supplies to the Continent while it takes one to Alexandria.

I ask you to consider seriously the possibility of early action in Europe. New methods must be tried; old ones have failed. New men must be used; old ones discarded. Such a move as I am proposing calls for the closest unity in command—as in the fighting itself. American troops in Ireland and Britain are ready to move. With deep earnestness I suggest that the United Nations together be called to this great task and that the best men in the entire group be given responsibility for carrying it out. If an Englishman should head the United Nations command for an invasion of Europe, very well. But if the ablest leader is to be found in Russia, or among the Free French, or the Poles, let us not for any reasons of national preference pass him over.

This is my proposal, Winston. What do you think of it?

FREDA KIRCHWEY

That Liberal Majority

THE Supreme Court ended its session for the year with two revealing decisions. One provides a loophole in the Wage-Hour Law through which employers may evade payment of overtime. The other weakens constitutional guaranties of free thought and expression. Each was a 5-4 decision. The majority in the first was Byrnes, Roberts, Jackson, Frankfurter, and Chief Justice Stone. The majority in the second was Reed, Roberts, Jackson, Frankfurter, and Byrnes. Black, Douglas, and Murphy dissented in both cases; Reed joined them in the first case, the Chief Justice in the second. These decisions are further stages in the division of this New Deal court into a new majority and minority. The core of the new liberal minority are Black and Douglas; of the new conservative majority, Roberts and Byrnes, neither New Dealers. While the others remain more difficult to predict, Murphy tends toward the liberals, Reed, Jackson, and Frankfurter toward the conservatives. The Chief Justice is not easily placed on economic questions, but seems to be the most dependable member of the court on questions involving basic liberties. The most interesting tendency to be noted is the steady movement of Justice Frankfurter toward the right. If continued, it will mean a great loss to American progressivism.

It is safe to surmise from the general social and political outlook of Justices Byrnes and Roberts that neither is sympathetic with the Wage-Hour Law. It is sad to see Stone, Frankfurter, and Jackson taken in by the sweet company-union overtones of Byrnes in the wage-hour case. This case had to do with individual labor contracts made by a newspaper publisher and radio-station owner in Dallas to get around the overtime pay requirements of the Wage-Hour Law. By these contracts, and their ingenious manipulation of hourly rates, the employer succeeded in continuing to work his men 54½ hours a week at the same weekly rate of pay as before. Byrnes, in the opinion accepted by the majority, dwells on the patriarchal goodness of the employing corporation. It gave the men time off with pay for illness. It carried life insurance for them. It took care of old employees. These touching details throw more light on the mental processes of the new conservative majority than on the overtime sections of the Wage-Hour Law.

The other decision is an echo of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the flag-salute case. In that case the Chief Justice alone dissented from a ruling which subjects a great nation to the ignominy of forcing children to salute its flag in violation of their religious principles. We are happy to see that Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, who joined Frankfurter in that decision, have written a joint note in this case declaring that they now believe the flag-salute decision was wrong. This new case also con-

cerns members of Jehovah's Witnesses. They refused to pay license fees for the sale of their religious literature. The majority upheld convictions of the Witnesses for failure to pay the tax.

The majority opinion is arid and pettifogging. The division in the court rested on a question of emphasis. Two quotations will illustrate the difference. In the opinion written by Justice Murphy and concurred in by Douglas, Black, and Stone, it is said "If this court is to err in evaluating claims that freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion have been invaded, far better that it err in being overprotective of these precious rights." Our one Catholic Justice does honor to himself, his church, and our American traditions by championing the anti-Catholic Witnesses.

A different attitude is revealed by the majority, speaking through Reed. "Too many settled beliefs have in time been rejected," it admits unctuously, "to justify this generation in refusing a hearing to its own dissentients. But that hearing may be limited by action of the proper legislative body to times, places, and methods for the enlightenment of the community which, in view of existing social and economic conditions, are not at odds with the preservation of peace and good order." The minority is ready to take a chance on freedom. The majority prefers, though ever so mildly, to regulate the spread of ideas. A majority of this kind inspires little confidence as a guardian of free discussion in time of deep feeling or war. It is more apt to cover prejudice with the garments of legalism.

"It Was Serrano Suñer"

ON THE subject of Serrano Suñer's recent visit to Rome, we are in a position to give our readers a completely inside story. First of all, we can report that the Spanish Foreign Minister made his long journey from Madrid to Rome by train—not partly by car as was first stated. Thus he avoided the diplomatic bad taste of using, for an official visit to a country with which the United States is at war, some of the oil we are still sending Spain under the "realistic" policy of our State Department. He doubtless felt that to Americans limited to three weekly gallons, a 2,200-mile trip by automobile would seem excessive.

But that is not the only bit of news we have to offer on the Mussolini-Suñer meeting. Again contrary to rumor, which had hinted at an eventual cession of the Balearic Islands to Italy, we are able to inform our readers that the conversations were limited to ways of using more efficiently the islands and ports already at the service of Germany and Italy. The status quo in the Mediterranean remains unchanged. Spain will go on, as it has since the beginning of the war, giving German

and Italian submarines the hospitality of the Spanish naval bases. So much and no more.

But our story would be incomplete if we failed to reveal the actual background of this latest visit of Señor Suñer to Rome. Last February both British and American diplomats in Madrid reported with evident satisfaction the development of a serious clash between General Franco and his brother-in-law, the Foreign Minister. Of course the thing had been expected; Allied diplomacy had been playing for a break for many months. You could call Franco a reactionary, a fascist, but he was a patriot and a gentleman just the same. As with Pétain, you could be sure that one day or another he would throw out the men in his cabinet who acted more as representatives of German and Italian interests than as leaders of the new "Blue Empire." The diplomats were right; the break was genuine. Only the long cipher reports to London and Washington failed to explain the real cause. In the background of the internal conflict between Franco and Suñer, between the army and the Phalanx, between the elements inclined toward the United Nations and the pro-Axis group, was an Andalusian midwinter night's dream.

Señor Serrano Suñer had met her in Seville: "*Morena y sevillana*," brunette and from Seville, as a popular Spanish song puts it. He brought back to Madrid, as a souvenir, an affliction which sounds no more respectable when suffered by a Phalangist. Nor was the situation improved when Señora Suñer became a victim and finally revealed the painful fact to her sister, Señora Franco. There followed terrific scenes in the Dictator's household, family conferences, councils of war, admonitions and threats—and every evidence of a final break. But the Allied diplomats were premature in congratulating themselves on the outcome of their patient appeasement. Nothing lasts forever, not even the unhappy effects of ill-considered romance. Thanks to the intervention of a most respected prelate, Serrano Suñer dropped the *sevillana* and peace and reconciliation descended on the official households. As a reward of virtue, the Foreign Minister was allowed to proceed to Rome and renew his policy of collaboration with the Axis.

Of the whole episode, there remain only a collection of diplomatic reports and a verse in three lines that has run like fire through Spain and Latin America, where a rhymed squib carries more political punch than ten thousand editorials.

*Se ha perdido una mujer—
Se enamoró de un serrano;
Era Serrano Suñer!*

(A woman was lost—
She fell in love with a *serrano*;
It was Serrano Suñer!)

* A "serrano," in roughly equivalent American slang, is a "wolf."

Nelson and Guthrie

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, June 22

ON THIS, the first anniversary of the Nazi attack upon the Soviet Union, the atmosphere of the capital is compounded equally of gloom and fatuity. The best opinion here is that Churchill arrived, not to plan a second front this year, but to dissuade the President from attempting one. Rommel has since reinforced Churchill's argument by taking Tobruk and threatening Egypt; the Axis continues to hold the initiative on all fronts. The Navy Department, which seems to have learned little from Pearl Harbor, is busy issuing soothing syrup on the Japanese invasion of the Aleutians. It is now admitted that the Japanese have occupied Kiska, 650 miles west of Dutch Harbor, as well as Attu, westernmost island of the chain, but we are assured that the weather on both islands is very bad, "foggy"—maybe the Japanese will all come down with bronchitis and cough themselves to death. Bases in the Aleutians can be used by submarines and planes to raid our shipping if Japan attacks Siberia, or they can be utilized for bombing raids on the Western hemisphere. The Navy Department's light-minded attitude toward this Japanese invasion of our territory is appalling.

This giddiness-in-the-head is not confined to the Navy Department. Pap has been pouring from the press agents of the Administration, the War Production Board, and the National Association of Manufacturers. The Truman committee on the Guthrie case offers an antidote for the hurrah stories on production, but it will be shelved and forgotten as rapidly as possible. A whole corps of clever propaganda analysts are at work here, listening in on the Axis radio and scanning the Axis press, but few seem to realize that our most dangerous fifth column is complacency and that Washington rather than Berlin remains the most important source of the poison.

The Axis has two principal propaganda objectives. One is to divide. The other is to lull the victim into a false sense of security. The second task, with some encouragement, can usually be left to the victim himself. To paraphrase an advertising slogan, it may be instructive to know the truth, but it's more fun to be fooled. Few here will admit that Tobruk fell, as Manila and Singapore fell, partly because the arsenal of democracy, two years after the launching of the defense program, isn't delivering the goods.

Carefully read and considered, the Truman report on the Guthrie case is the key to the continued setbacks suffered by ourselves and our allies. The arsenal of democracy, as the Guthrie case and the reactions to the

report show, is still being operated with one eye on the war and the other on the convenience of big business. The progress made on production so far is the fruit of necessity and improvisation rather than of foresight and planning, and the men running the program are not willing to fight business interests on behalf of military efficiency. Donald Nelson is full of good will and good intentions, but the only battle he has staged since becoming head of the War Production Board was his fight last week to suppress the Guthrie report.

The Guthrie report shows that, months after Pearl Harbor, the men Nelson put in charge of converting the consumer durable-goods industries to war were still trying their best to postpone curtailment of civilian production. It shows that when it came to the test Nelson took his stand with the men of "business as usual" against a business man who seemed only to be acting on the principles Nelson himself was expressing in his speeches. It shows that Nelson and his aides are still trying to palm off curtailment as the equivalent of conversion, although the former is only the first and negative step of the process. It shows that the big-business crowd is as powerfully entrenched under Nelson as it was under Knudsen. It shows that we are not going to get maximum utilization of our resources until there is a shakeup more fundamental than the adding of the new alphabetic alias to the series NDAC-OPM-SPAB-WPB. That shakeup will be effective only if labor, small business, and independent engineering talent are brought into the agencies supposed to direct the mobilization of industry. For the demonstration, and the statements, though some of them were left to implication, the country is indebted to Senator Truman and his colleagues, especially Ball, Brewster, and Mead. They stuck to their guns under pressure from Nelson.

It is important to realize that we are in a very critical period of war production. The shortage of basic materials, which might cost us victory, is itself a victory for the big-business status quo. The shortage of materials has become an excuse for dropping plans to expand basic industries. It has become an excuse for concentrating war output in the new plane, tank, and ordnance plants instead of spreading the work out to smaller-business men. The big-business crowd has succeeded so far in fighting the war its way—with a minimum of conversion, a maximum of new war plants, a minimum of industrial expansion, as much monopoly as possible, and without the dreaded admission of labor into the councils of management. For despite plant committees, labor today has less

influence and less voice than ever before in the planning and direction of the war-production program. Yet labor participation is needed more than ever in the basic material-producing and mining industries, for there is no doubt that in the case of many materials the shortage is remediable. We could produce more copper and we could produce more steel if we were prepared to impose overall control and rationalization of production in these industries.

The solution of our problems lies in a more democratic direction of our industrial effort, but the trend is the other way. The next step will be to merge the industrial branches of the WPB in the army and navy, where it will be more difficult than ever for labor to have a voice, where there will be less interference than ever from Leon Henderson's hard-working little crew of all-outers in civilian supply, and where the "dollar-a-year men" can more easily be shielded from criticism. It is harder to spot a big-business man in uniform than in mufti, and Congressional committees are shyer of criticizing "the military." Thus the Truman committee pulled its punches

when Undersecretary Patterson intervened last winter to postpone conversion of the radio industry and when the supply branches of the army pleaded for business as usual in the typewriter industry.

The Guthrie report shows how a "plutodemocracy"—to use Mussolini's favorite phrase—mobilizes for war. When the Truman committee last January criticized the dollar-a-year men for their tendency to feather their own nests, Nelson rushed forward not only to defend them but to claim that criticism was interfering with the war effort by making it more difficult to bring more dollar-a-year men to Washington. A hitherto unpublished story indicates how Guthrie, the maverick, put himself in wrong with the gang the day he was made Philip Reed's assistant. He shocked Reed and WPB General Counsel John Lord O'Brian by announcing that he was selling his stock and giving up his directorship in White Sewing Machine Company because the sewing-machine industry was one of those he would be expected to help convert to war purposes. "You're certainly a rare bird," O'Brian told him—much too rare to last, as it turned out.

The Score After Midway

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

THE Battle of Midway was easily the best news of the war as it was also the first decisive check on Japan. While news is so far incomplete, the outlines of the Nipponese scheme of campaign are plain.

It is a plan astonishing for its boldness and complete underestimation of American strength. For Japan, as for the United States, there are three main routes by which the war may be carried on a large scale into enemy waters. The Coral Sea battle, while not decisive, doubtless convinced the Japanese of the danger of trying to sever our southern communication lines or of attempting a campaign by the use of such distant stepping stones as the islands north of Australia. In their attacks along the lightly guarded Aleutian chain and in the heavy offensive against Hawaii by way of Midway, the Japanese tried these other two lines of attack simultaneously. One was apparently light while the other used a large share of the Japanese navy's striking power. Both were utterly unsound strategically and could have succeeded only against a much weaker opponent.

The surprising thing is not that the attacks failed but that they were attempted at all. Japanese admirals may have been suffering from extreme cockiness; or over-anxious to avenge their check in the Coral Sea, they perhaps convinced themselves that they could repeat their "impossible" exploit of December 7.

Very likely the Japanese attacked the Aleutians in order to seize bases from which they could interfere with aid to Siberia in case of a later thrust in that direction. The slight degree of success in this attempt must be quickly canceled if Japanese "digging in" and consolidation is to be prevented. But American dominance in the Hawaii-Aleutians-Canal Zone triangle is overwhelming. Not only did the enemy find abundant shore-based airpower, capable of rapid reinforcement from the mainland, but its forces penetrated into waters dominated by superior American seapower operating close to home bases. The sea and air dominance of the United States extends for a fair distance beyond Hawaii and its appendage, Midway. Even Wake in mid-Pacific was well within the range of supporting forces and would not have been lost if the Pearl Harbor disaster had not disorganized our fighting strength. The Japanese, therefore, in trying to penetrate our outer defenses in the Pacific, advanced beyond the protection of their own shore-based airpower and placed themselves well within reach of our military as well as naval aviation long before they were within gunnery range of Midway. Only an attempted conquest of Hawaii which, had it succeeded, would probably have ended all American chances of winning the war, might conceivably have justified the assumption of such risks. With all the cards stacked

against it, Japan took a long chance on the possibility of large winnings—and lost.

While Japanese ship losses are considerable they may be less vital than indicated by some commentators. The battle of Midway, though a Japanese defeat, was no catastrophe. Its results were greater than those of Jutland but not to be compared with those of Tsushima or Manila. Had our slow battleships come into action in the later stages of the conflict, they might easily have turned defeat into a rout and, because of their ability to continue pursuit longer and pour in a much greater volume of firepower, might have annihilated a badly crippled enemy. As it is, unless Japan has many more plane carriers than those for which it has received credit (something very possible), or unless American estimates of damage are far from accurate (much less likely), at least half of Japanese ship-based aviation has been wiped out. And this has been accomplished at comparatively slight cost to ourselves. Since planes form the spearhead of modern naval attack, it is safe to say that Japan will find it difficult to undertake large-scale sea offensives for months, possibly years, to come. Conversely, our operations may be pushed with greater boldness.


On the other hand, the victory itself was essentially negative. With conditions very much in our favor we stopped a powerful Japanese drive, but we have yet to launch a powerful Pacific offensive of our own. And we cannot hope to win the war by merely parrying the enemy's blows. If the threat of land-based airpower prevents our taking the offensive, as it stopped our following a defeated enemy, we will encounter grave difficulties in winning today's war. The considerations which prevented our following up the Midway victory may have been strategically sound but they represent a far different policy to the "Damn-the-torpedoes.-Full-speed-ahead" doctrine of Faragut.

As a matter of fact, caution has been the keynote of our operations in the Pacific. Aside from a few raids which we have not followed up with an offensive campaign, we have left the initiative entirely to the Japanese. This policy must ultimately be abandoned, though the reasons for following it at the moment may be perfectly sound. In the first place, the United States has less reason for speed than pre-

viously because it has already lost all that effective air and naval intervention could have made less vulnerable. It is no secret that Germany comes first as the object of American war efforts. Again, it is undoubtedly true that American seapower, scattered over the seven seas on convoy duty, probably lacks the crushing superiority needed to battle Japan on even terms in its own waters. Under such circumstances our admirals may be quite willing to await the completion of more ships, on the grounds that delay now strengthens their forces more than it does those of Japan.

The more complete information which has been made available on the Coral Sea engagement explains why both Japan and the United States could claim victory. The Japanese apparently succeeded in effecting landings in both the Louisiade and Solomon groups, though at a disproportionate loss. The gigantic Lexington with its capacity of nearly one hundred planes will, however, be missed. The destruction of the Ryukaku and the injury to the Shokaku reveal that at least two new plane carriers other than those generally known to be in existence were completed by the Japanese before the war. They therefore started the war with at least nine carriers as compared to the seven belonging to us and of our seven three were probably in the Atlantic at the time war broke out.

The recent Pacific battles mark a revolutionary change in naval warfare. The torpedo has replaced the gun as the primary weapon mainly owing to its enormously greater range when carried by air. Battleships are not



yet obsolete. With their enormous firepower they can, if guarded from air assault, do vastly more damage from short range than a plane carrier, but they are clearly secondary to longer ranged planes, and our older ships are too slow to add their gunpower to our cruiser-carrier striking groups.

There is one corollary to the fights in the Pacific that is deeply disturbing to the United States. If the superiority of land-based planes over both naval vessels and naval aircraft proves too great to permit such operations as carrier-raids on Japan proper, or sea and air offensives through the Japanese mandates, then American war plans will require drastic alteration. The step by step advances through the central or north Pacific will cease to be feasible and we shall be reduced to the initial use of land-based airpower.

The bases available for warfare of this kind are all but non-existent. Australia can be used, but not for attacks upon Japan proper, merely for attempts at an island-by-island reconquering of the enemy's earlier

gains. Because the ways to Japan are so indirect, the distance from the United States so great, and the transportation and industrial system so backward by American standards, Australia should be a last, not a first choice as a base from which to launch an air offensive.

Japan's current campaign against China dates from General Doolittle's raid on Tokyo and is clearly for the purpose of eliminating "Shangri-la" as an air base. Unfortunately, we were not prepared to back up that raid by giving such aid to China as would enable it to hold its coastal sections.

There remains Siberia as a future possibility. This is, above all, the ideal air base from which to hit Japan. Vladivostok is within light-bomber range of every single major objective in the island empire. We must be prepared to keep open air lines to this country and rush reinforcements in, in case of Japanese attack. It is extremely unlikely that a Japanese attack here, the one major remaining threat to metropolitan Japan, will now be long delayed.

China's Peril Is Our Own

BY GEORGE E. TAYLOR

CHINA is facing the greatest crisis in its history since the establishment of the National Government in 1928. Those of us who have loved it and respected it must share, in these dark days, the bitterness, the disillusionment, and the apprehension which now consume it. The country with the longest and most consistent record of struggle against Axis aggression, the country which has lost more men, and killed more Japanese than any other, is now facing, almost alone, the fury of a renewed Japanese offensive which aims to put it out of the war for good. The tragedy of China has already happened; it has not been furnished the materials of war it asked for and in spite of the brave defense it is putting up its main armies are being pushed back into the western provinces, and its people driven to death and starvation. China is in desperate straits.

The tragedy is one of lost opportunity, of lack of appreciation of the role of China in this war and the importance of its armies to final victory. Look at the map of Asia and imagine China under Japanese control—see the great sweep of territory bordering the Soviet Union and India and the strategic possibilities this opens up to Japan and its Axis partners, consider the manpower of China, what it means to Japan and what its loss would mean to us, think of the effect that China's fall would have upon the morale of India's millions and upon the overrun populations of Southeast Asia. Above

all, think how difficult would be a land attack upon Japan, especially upon its great industrial base in Manchuria, if China were out of the fight.

No wonder China is angry and alarmed. While America and Great Britain were out of the war China, in the hope of future assistance, defended itself against Japan even when the markets of the world were open to Tokyo; now that the allies it longed for have entered the struggle it is almost isolated from the western world, unable to get supplies from the Soviet Union, and compelled to face Japan alone, a Japan flushed with victory and with men and materials to spare. With the fall of the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma, millions of overseas Chinese came under Japanese rule and substantial financial contributions to the war were lost with them. The loss of the Burma Road, which we thought at one time could be made up by air transport, was followed by the loss of northern Burma, which removed the air bases necessary for transport planes. Now the problem of getting in and out of China even by air is one of great technical difficulty, and it is complicated by the danger of Japanese fighter plane opposition.

Japan can afford to throw away cruisers, carriers, and even battleships against the American fleet and land-based aircraft so long as these expeditions achieve one of their major objectives, that of keeping America sufficiently worried about its own shores to forget China.

It is worth sacrificing half the Japanese fleet to conquer China and to create the illusion of victory in the United States. Ships of war and airplanes can be replaced by Japan but how can America replace millions of trained Chinese troops, air bases within flying distance of Japan, and the one great continental ally on the Pacific? If the 450 millions of China go under, what will it avail us with the peoples of Asia to say that at least we saved the 7 millions of "white" Australia?

Why has China been sent too little material and that little too late? The Chinese feel the main reason lies in the apparent determination of those responsible for the strategy of the United Nations to consider Hitler the chief enemy and concentrate on him while leaving Japan for future treatment. Their attitude has been consistent; as the nations came into the struggle one by one, they have been welcomed by the Chinese as allies in the common cause against the Axis. The Chinese were realistic enough to see that it was the British people, more than the British government, who insisted that Hitler and fascism be stopped. The Chinese saw the entry of Britain and France into the war as the acquisition of allies against the Axis. While others were doing their best to sabotage the war effort in America and were analyzing the struggle between Germany and Great Britain as an imperialist war, the Chinese were pleading for the mobilization of the democratic powers against aggression. China's analysis of world affairs has stood the test of time much better than that of almost any other country.

It is tragic that this very analysis should now be used to China's disadvantage. Those who did not see the global nature of the war until Soviet Russia was involved are now among the first to use this definition to the disadvantage of the Chinese. The argument runs that the place where planes, guns, and tanks can be most effectively used is on the Russian front, and that it is wiser for the United Nations to make a combined attack on Hitler from all sides, leaving China to hold on against admittedly enormous odds. This, it is argued, would defeat Japan more quickly and more surely than any other strategy. China is cynically told that it has grown stronger during the past five years, particularly, one might suggest, during the past five months, which have seen the closing of every door to outside assistance. China is told that it can do much more to mobilize its own political and economic resources and that if it could attend to the achievement of greater unity among its fighting forces, it would be more difficult for Japan to succeed in its present campaign. At a time when China is appealing to the Soviet Union to open up a second front in the Far East against Japan it is told to hold the Japanese offensive alone and look to its own unity. The Soviet Union cannot possibly be asked to assist it and, moreover, must have all the guns, planes, and tanks we can

spare. Nothing for China except advice, not even a word of encouragement.

This view is not that of the President and the State Department, who have given China encouragement if they did not always succeed in giving it arms. And one reason why arms did not arrive in time was certainly the rapidity of Japan's advance. American plans for aid to China were real enough, but were made on a much longer time basis. Now that the task is more difficult it is more urgent and must be fitted in with other obligations.

There is no question that any reasonable person is more than persuaded that every possible assistance must be sent to the Soviet Union, for the war can still be lost on the Russian front. But is it necessary, in order to emphasize the importance of one continental ally, to overlook the other? It may be the course of wisdom to open a second front immediately in western Europe—though this is hardly a matter for laymen to decide—but in order to open a front at all, certain other fronts must be held, particularly the Russian and the Chinese. This should be clear enough to anyone except those who interpret the phrase "global war" to mean the Soviet Union's war and no one else's.

How can we assume that if Hitler is defeated Japan will automatically go down? Time is on the side of Japan—give it time and it will consolidate its great empire, turn India into a chaotic shambles, and construct tremendous fortifications. And if Hitler is defeated, who will fight Japan? Can we assume that Soviet Russia will plunge into the struggle in the East if it is not attacked? Why should it? Will Britain fight for the restoration of its Pacific empire? How would America fare against Japan with a conquered China, a neutral Russia, and a Britain with no great heart in the struggle? It is noteworthy that the Anglo-Russian alliance did not mention the Far East, only Germany and its allies in Europe. The Pacific is America's job, and China is its ally just as the Soviet Union is Britain's ally in Europe.

There is certainly as much reason to have confidence in China's armies as in the mighty forces of the Soviet Union. This is far too serious a matter for anyone to complicate by indulging in odious comparisons, but China did not retreat any faster than Russia when attacked; it has suffered as much in terms of lost territory and civilian population; it has scorched as much earth; it has lost more men; it has been more consistently anti-Axis. Whereas Russia started the war with armies comparable to those of Germany and in some ways superior, no one would think of comparing the equipment of China's armies with those of Japan. Yet China has driven the Japanese from some areas without offensive weapons, without tanks, heavy guns, or planes. One fraction of the weapons sent to the Soviet Union or even to Australia

would have enabled China to dislodge the Japanese from key positions and to protect the airfields which were being built to bomb Japan. No country wanted less and could have done more with it.

As time goes on the consequences of bombing Tokyo will become more and more apparent. Did we expect the Japanese to do nothing about it? Did we expect them not to destroy the American and Chinese bases from which the experiment could be repeated? After Australia had won a major diplomatic victory in persuading America to send MacArthur and military equipment there rather than to China, which we could much less afford to lose than Australia, it was disastrous to bomb Tokyo before providing China with enough planes and other equipment to defend the bases for offensive action on which so much time and labor had already been spent. While there may have been very good domestic reasons for bombing Tokyo at this time it does not follow that they were weighed against the price that China, or for that matter America, would have to pay for it. Japan, it is true, had very good reasons for attacking China in any case, but if it were in doubt as to the direction in which to strike, the bombing of Tokyo must have done much to decide its course of action.

What of China? Can it hold the Japanese or are we watching its slow dismemberment? Fight it must, for there is no alternative it can accept. It has materials of war stored up but is naturally reluctant to use its last resources; it has also the very difficult problem of transporting them to the various fronts, for the Japanese advances have complicated the already difficult internal communications. The economic situation is bad, inflation is rampant, and the hoarding of goods is the main form of saving. The prestige of those Chinese who have always leaned toward Britain and America is low, for the Chinese feel that they have been left in the lurch.

The political situation in Chungking is critical; never has the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek been put to a greater test. But if China stands alone it will not fall; it is still no easy matter to conquer a new nation and force more than 400 million people to submit. It is partly on the assumption that China can take the punishment that strategic calculations have perhaps been based, but if strategy must be cold-blooded it is well to remember that China is composed of warm-blooded human beings whose sufferings concern us closely.

After a long period of comparative stalemate Japan's armies are striking once more into the living flesh of China. The Free China which faces it is still powerful in China's greatest assets, man-power and territory. The nine provinces of Chinghai, Kansu, Shensi, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Sikang, and Yunnan, which form an untouched nucleus, have a population of nearly 100 million people; the six adjoining partly occupied prov-

inces of Suiyuan, Honan, Kwantung, Shansi, Hupeh, and Hunan have at least another 66 million people who have never seen the Japanese. Separated from this compact mass, but in political and economic communication with it, are another 120 million people belonging to these six provinces. In the remaining provinces of North and Central China, which took the brunt of Japanese occupation, some 100 million people are maintaining themselves in more or less active opposition to the Japanese. Japan probably directly controls, therefore, according to latest reports from Guenther Stein in Chungking, no more than 50 and no less than 25 million Chinese. Japan still has a long way to go. But if it is willing to pay the price it can do enormous damage to China, and it has never been in a better position to pay the price.

What will happen, then, in China? China will lose territory and men and consume precious supplies; it will probably be made useless as an offensive base against Japan for years to come. All these things can be measured in terms of additional American casualties. If it is too late to use China as it might have been used, as an offensive land base against Japan, it is not too late to do two things, to ponder on the price that China is paying for our grand strategy and to reassure the Chinese, at this time of trial and torture, of the place that they will have in the world order for which the United Nations are fighting; and to make every effort to get some material assistance to China's armies. Is it too much to ask our Russian allies, whose fight has already done so much to turn the tide of war, if not to open a second front in the East, at least to make every sacrifice to get materials to China? It is our duty, not Russia's, to provide the materials, but the Soviet Union now controls the effective routes. There is much we could do in the way of diverting Japanese ships and planes from China, and the cost would be much less than the cost if China were to fall. If we can keep the Chinese fighting we can still rally the peoples of Asia actively to our side.

At present the Chinese do not even share our counsels on equal terms. They should at least be told our aims and given our encouragement. Those great intellects who think that Japan is going to be such an easy matter to deal with when Hitler is defeated and tell us that it is dangerous to talk now of war aims because they might get in the way of winning the war, ought to be shipped out to China and assigned the task of explaining to the Chinese why global strategy means that they are to get no planes, tanks, and guns—and do this without mentioning what we are fighting for. Now of all times is the moment to tell China where it fits into the picture of strategy and war aims; now it is more essential than ever to get to it the most impressive propaganda of all—materials of war, a task in which all the United Nations must share.

Britain's New Left

BY TOM WINTRINGHAM

London, June 2

BBRITISH politics today is dominated by the fact that the common man is cutting loose from old forms and ideas and from political parties and leaders that six months ago seemed almost irreplaceable. In what direction the common man will go is not clear. Nor is it certain who will express his hopes and influence his thinking. But among the factors that will certainly enter into the making of new popular policies, and probably new parties, we can today reckon the following: Sir Stafford Cripps, whose independence is much of his strength, two groups of independent politicians with whom I will deal later, and the majority of the members of the Labor Party.

Sir Stafford Cripps plays his lone hand in the War Cabinet as the representative of the first big push by the common man against the old parties. His position is well known to American readers, and I need not add more than one fact: it is widely believed that in his efforts to bring a New Deal in Britain and a new inspiration for the United Nations in their war, Cripps's main opposition within the government comes from the leaders of the Labor Party, and in the country from their direct representatives and from the Communist Party.

The second big push by the common man against the old parties is marked by the nomination of independent candidates at by-elections, three of whom have defeated regular government candidates during the past two months. These independents, candidates, or M. P.'s, divide sharply into two groups. One group has called itself at different times the Democratic Alliance and the People's Party. It includes politicians of varied experience: Mr. W. J. Brown, leader of a civil servants' trade union, who has held many political viewpoints (if "held" is the right word; none lasted long); the ex-Tory Cunningham-Reid, apparently ex-Tory because even the Conservative Party did not properly appreciate his expedition to Hawaii during the early part of the war (our war; he came back before Pearl Harbor); and an assortment of young men who express only the deep frustrations governing the lives of the young in England. The common platform of this group, as far as it has one, is negative: they are against most things. They are not fascists, but should the demagogic expression of frustration, without any positive drive to reshape the social and economic order, take a fascist direction they might drift the same way.

The second group of independents belong mainly to

two organizations, Sir Richard Acland's "Forward March" and J. B. Priestley's "1941 Committee." Together they support a body provisionally called the "Nine Point Group," from the nine points of the declaration recently put out over the signatures of Acland, Priestley, George Reakes, M. P., the independent recently elected at Wallasey, and myself. The list of those signing or supporting this manifesto is growing rapidly and includes economists and university professors, trade unionists and technicians, architects and novelists, and one or two of the more far-sighted industrialists.

Sir Richard Acland is a member of Parliament who, elected as a liberal, turned six or seven years ago to a vigorous Christian Communism around which he built his Forward March. He and his group of crusaders influenced the Malvern decisions of a representative part of the Church of England, and have swung much of what remains alive in that church toward the view that great changes must take place in society if men are to live good lives. The first decisive victory for an independent candidate standing on a positive program of socialism now, socialism in order to win the war, was very largely a victory for Acland personally. His was the only national backing for the victorious candidate at Wallasey, who won by more than 6,000 votes—an enormous majority for these days when polls are necessarily small.

The key point in Dick Acland's program, which his advocacy has made perhaps the most important of the nine points of our declaration, is that we need to transfer to common ownership, during the war and for the purposes of the war, "services, industries, and companies in which managerial inefficiency or the profit motive is harming the war effort. This," our statement continues, "will increase the war effort and will be a token of the post-war New Deal in which common ownership of all the great resources of the country must become the fundamental basis of our whole economic life."

It is no longer, for us, a question of some form of control by the state or community over private profit-making industry. During the war there has been an immense amount of this control; not only has it failed to solve the problem of inefficient management but it has added to it the problem of civil-service inefficiency. We know that a change as great as this—from private ownership to public, of the great resources of the country—cannot be made during the war; but we insist that the worst scandals in production should be cleared up by

taking from their present owners the actual direction of the firms in question, and running them with the single aim of getting maximum production.

In particular we stand for immediate nationalization of the coal industry. The whole business of coal has been shockingly muddled here; our homes will be bitterly cold next winter and even our war plants are likely to be hampered in consequence. There is a wave of small strikes; men escape from the mines into other jobs any way they can; the ordinary economic incentives of profit on the one hand and pay on the other no longer work. The incentive of patriotism does not work well enough, largely because the miners have a deeply ingrained and well-justified feeling that the owners' patriotism has always, in the past, taken second place to profits, and that if peace "broke out" tomorrow the owners would not hesitate to shovel miners by the hundred thousand on to the scrap heap of unemployment if that gave them a greater margin of gain. In these conditions no measure of government control, no temporary plan, will supply the men and the technicians with a new incentive to extraordinary efforts. Straight nationalization would provide that incentive. To many managers it would be a relief: instead of being hampered by two controlling bodies—government and shareholders—pulling in divergent directions, they would be responsible to the government alone. They know that their labor troubles would be over for a period; that the men would work as fiercely for the needs of their country as Russians are working today.

Is this, as some have represented it, a longing for a

totalitarian collectivism, abolishing all the rights of democracy for which section after section of the British people have fought stubbornly and shrewdly for centuries? No; that is not what the English want; nor is it our aim. The central and most difficult problem in the building of a new society today is how to make a real marriage between economic collectivism, forced on us by the collapse of capitalism, and the freedoms that are our most precious inheritance. Our socialism needs more than an addition of timidly measured cupfuls of democracy; it needs to be socialism reinforced by democracy alive and kicking. That is why our nine-point statement asks for "the energy and enthusiasm of a free people who know what they fight for and love what they know . . . a really vital democracy throughout our public life—social, economic, and political."

And this is where J. B. Priestley comes in. Many in America will know his writings. Many have heard him broadcast. What they cannot easily know is his standing as a politician in this country. Yet it was not until Dunkirk that he began to speak and write in a way that bore immediately on the political problems of the nation. Then his broadcast "postscripts" made him, for three months or more, the voice of the British as a people. When the powers-that-be kept him from the microphone—his words were becoming too powerful and too popular—he set up an informal committee of "men who know their jobs" to discuss and work out the politics of vital democracy.

Priestley has English caution and English common-sense, a hatred of all "isms," and no liking for politics as such. It has not been easy for him to take the decision that led him recently to begin campaigning in South Wales for an independent who stands for our nine points. But his decision may mark a turning point in the political history of Britain. It would not be fair to represent Acland simply by the word collectivism and Priestley by the word freedom; but when the two of them work together in the building of a new political movement, common ownership and vital democracy are so merged that each in fact multiplies the effect of the other.

My own part in the business derives from this: I believe that to do our share in winning this war, we in Britain must make it completely a peoples' war and must stop



trying to fight it as a war for the defense of the empire. As a journalist and as an instructor in the training schools I have helped to shape the Home Guard and to alter radically the tactical training of the army. I learned the basis of my politics in Moscow in 1920; fighting in Spain strengthened my belief that an army must be morally united and without class conflicts if it is to do the best possible job, and that initiative and morale depend on the population as well as on the army. Having got as far as I could without direct intervention in politics, I resigned from a War Office job in June, 1941, and soon after joined Priestley and the 1941 Committee in the hope of helping to defeat politically the conservative stupidity which still hampers our fighting.

I was the first journalist in Britain to call for a second front. That second front may be a reality before this is printed; but it could never be a reality had we no Home Guard here to release regular troops for it, or if this force had consisted only of a few hundred thousand special constables, untrained as combatants. The agitation for a second front has run almost throughout English society; the noisier aspects have been monopolized by Lord Beaverbrook and the Communist Party, but if we land in Europe tomorrow, our action would be largely the result of pressure from men, sergeants, officers, and generals in the army, who are very tired of waiting and very envious of the Red Army's share in the war.

Where the Labor Party comes into all this worries many people here. Even on coal it stands not for nationalization but for some form of control. It has done little to express the desire for a second front. Its leadership has clung to the electoral truce until independents made that truce utterly unreal. Yet at the recent Labor Party conference a resolution supporting the electoral truce was carried by so tiny a majority that the platform was in effect defeated. The rank and file of the party want to break the electoral truce, whether or not this implies pulling Labor out of the government. These Labor Party members want to express the deep surge of feeling in the country in favor of rapid changes in the way the war is fought and the factories are run. My own guess is that the leaders of the Labor Party will not permit them to do this, and that the party will remain frustrated and ineffective for some time to come.

If the new movement now led by Acland and Priestley has to become a new political party, and has to act in some way as a rival of the Labor Party, this development will be against our own desires and against the desire of most members of the Labor Party. We would rather be the allies of the Labor Party; better still we would like to see such changes in the Labor Party outlook that the forces we represent could find a place within it. The men to whom the name Cripps means hope, the men who would vote for any independent

rather than for a candidate of the old parties, the men to whom the "Russian glory" has not meant—as it has meant for some thousands—a desire to join the Communist Party but a desire to do something useful, these men are now politically unorganized. If the Labor Party changes far more rapidly than seems probable, it can win these new forces and hold the vigorous younger men and women now within its ranks. If it does not change, the Labor Party will lose both.

In the Wind

THE LATEST CRUSADE of Marshall Field's PM has been to force New York newspapers to drop advertisements of hotels that discriminate against Jews and Negroes and indicate their policy by the words "restricted" or "Christian" clientele. But while Marshall Field's PM has been campaigning against "hate ads," Marshall Field's Chicago *Sun* has been publishing them every day.

BRITISH COMMUNISTS have lost one hero and found another. For some obscure reason, the party is now very critical of Sir Stafford Cripps, but it is lavish in its praise of Lord Beaverbrook.

AN EXCERPT from a prohibition pamphlet now being circulated in the South: "Not one penny of the liquor tax money ever goes into the building of an airplane or gun—but even if it did, that airplane or gun would never serve the cause of our country. Why? Because it would be built with tainted money. Liquor taxes built the Maginot Line and look what happened to France. Ladies and gentlemen, France fell because of liquor taxes."

STEVE HANNIGAN, who did publicity for the State of Florida, has been retained by Henry Ford to tell the world that Ford is a patriot and a democrat. A story that may or may not be part of this publicity campaign was recently told to a New York newspaperman by Harry Bennett, Ford's personnel director. Bennett said that after Lindbergh's famous Des Moines speech, in which the flyer warned the Jews not to be interventionists, Ford called Lindbergh in and rebuked him severely.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY is now divided into four factions, each representing a different attitude toward the war. One is pacifist; one takes the traditional class-war position; one, led by Norman Thomas, advocates limited support of the government; and one argues that Socialists should act as if there was no war.

FROM AN ADVERTISEMENT in the *Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten*: "Grave crosses of finest oak, with cement base if desired, to trade for men's used clothing."

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

BOOKS and the ARTS

The Fourth Reich

WILL GERMANY CRACK? A FACTUAL REPORT ON GERMANY FROM WITHIN. By Paul Hagen. Translated by Anna Caples. Harper and Brothers. \$2.75.

PAUL HAGEN is singularly qualified to give the American reader an evaluation of present economic and political conditions in Germany. He was for years an active member of the German labor movement. As one of the founders and spokesmen of the "New Beginning" group he enjoys valuable political contacts in Europe. And through his work with the American Friends of German Freedom for whose *Inside Germany Reports* he has been largely responsible, he has acquired a more intimate knowledge of the American scene than most refugees. "Will Germany Crack?" is a timely and absorbing report.

Making critical use of official Nazi publications, German business data, and private factual information Hagen devotes the first part of his book to an analysis of some key problems of Hitler's war economy. He sees as its most acute difficulty a shortage of labor—"the chief symbol of the multiple crisis of scarcity in Germany." Shortage and declining productivity of labor, more than any other factor, limit the program of Germany's coal, iron, and steel production, says Hagen, and force the Nazis to employ an ever-growing number of their foreign labor conscripts and prisoners in vulnerable war industries. Shortage of industrial labor also dictates the Nazi policy toward the lower middle classes, the artisans and small shopkeepers whom they "comb out" of business by the hundreds of thousands to replace the skilled workers needed in the mechanized armed forces. Hagen's description of the state of Germany's productive plant should have a sobering effect on the mystics to whom Hitler's economic miracle is as overwhelming as it is inexplicable.

Informative as these economic chapters are, a good many readers will find more food for thought in the political conclusions Hagen draws from his analysis, and in his treatment of some of the outstanding post-war problems. The vital question he asks is really not whether Germany will crack, but how the Nazi war machine can be destroyed with a minimum of sacrifices, and the fruits of a democratic victory secured. His chapter, *How to Beat Hitler Politically*, offers some of the most convincing and eloquent advice ever addressed to those responsible for the United Nations' political warfare and the future peace of the world. One after the other, Hagen punctures the "easy" solutions, the dreams of the reactionaries, the hopes of the crowned houses, the chauvinistic cries for senseless destruction. "It is a great accomplishment for the Nazis and the other fascists," he writes, answering Vansittart and his friends, "to lure some of their enemies back to tribalism too, but we cannot defeat them by sinking to their depths; on their own level they are invincible."

There is little comfort in this book for people who still

believe in the German army, led by a conservative officers' corps, as the great counter force to the Nazi gangsters. Hagen traces the relations between the Nazis and the Reichswehr back to their treacherous solidarity at the very beginning of the Weimar Republic and proves beyond any doubt that political control and power over the armed forces rest today with the party's SS, not with the General Staff. There are conflicts of interests between the army and the party, and an effective political strategy will take them into consideration, but the author truly asserts that these conflicts disappear before the common menace of a democratic victory, just as the conflicts of interest between Nazis and big business melt away in the face of a threatening social revolution. Even the hopes of a return to the democracy of Weimar are not encouraged. Hagen sees neither a liberal opposition surviving in Germany nor an economic basis for its rebirth.

Who, then, if neither the army nor German big business, neither royal families nor Weimar democrats, will make reliable and powerful allies for the United Nations? Hagen does not exclude the possibility that one or all of these groups might give active support in one phase or another of the fight against the crumbling Nazi regime, but he counts them definitely as the less significant forces in Germany's anti-fascist potential. It is the greatest merit of his book, I think, to have rediscovered German labor as the strongest anti-Nazi power within the Third Reich and to have called the attention of the United Nations to the fact that they can have this tremendous force as an ally in a new Europe if they understand the signs of our time. Progressive statesmanship, he believes, should not fear the coming anti-fascist revolution in Germany and Italy, but help bring it about. It should not shrink from the necessity of solving Europe's vital problems in the framework of a European federation. They cannot be solved any longer in the morass of national chauvinism. Hagen regretfully states that so far the Allies have shown no tendency to include a European federation in their war aims and that even the Atlantic Charter evades the issue.

The spirit of more recent diplomatic agreements will hardly encourage him and his political friends.

KARL BILLINGER

Conquistador

THE KNIGHT OF EL DORADO: THE TALE OF DON GONZALO JIMENEZ DE QUESADA AND HIS CONQUEST OF NEW GRANADA, NOW CALLED COLOMBIA. By Germán Arciniegas. Translated by Mildred Adams. The Viking Press. \$3.

HEREDIA, in his meticulously chiseled sonnets, did perhaps more than anyone else to evaluate favorably the awesome deeds of the Conquistadors in defiance of Western Europe's long hostility toward them. In this country Archibald MacLeish, following that tradition, has so humanized men like Cortés and the anonymous seekers of

gain and glory that the accusations leveled at them lose their force.

To such an extent has our judgment now matured that we cannot ever again denounce the Conquistador out of ill-disciplined sentimentality. For the same reason we cannot let our Western partisanship blind us to the irreparable harm caused by the Iberic exploitation of empires and peoples. Sympathy for the Indians is imperative if we are to gain their cooperation in the common tasks, and so is appreciation for the daredevils who, in the secret designs of history, wrought the beginnings of a new fraternity of peoples. These two supplementary feelings now provide the emotional setting for the new attitude toward the Conquistador.

In the past twenty years or so Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, Americans, have treated more or less adequately the lives of the Spanish explorers and founders of the New World—Columbus, Magellan, Cabeza de Vaca, Ponce de Leon, Cortés, Alvarado, Pizarro, Las Casas, Coronado, etc. But Latin Americans have been a little slow in joining the school of reconstructed and imaginative biography started by Strachey, Maurois, Ludwig, and Zweig.

Now Germán Arciniegas, the present Colombian Minister of Education, in "The Knight of El Dorado," has told with humor, penetration, and deeply felt piety the story of Don Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, the conqueror, explorer, and founder of what is today Colombia. All travel books agree that Colombia is the most inaccessible territory of all South America even today; neither from the Pacific nor from the Atlantic is it easy to ascend the imposing *meseta* of Cundinamarca. But the Encyclopedia Britannica ignores the extraordinary achievement of Quesada, the Andalusian lawyer who accompanied Don Pedro Fernández de Lugo to the port of Santa Marta.

Don Pedro sent Quesada inland to the jungle in search of wealth and breathable air. The expedition lost over eight hundred out of a thousand men before reaching the Chibchas' lands. In the clear style of Señor Arciniegas a very dark page of early American history becomes dramatically alive. The most astonishing phase of the story is that there were, all told, three rebellious, adventurous captains, unaware of each other's existence, pressing hard from the north, the south, and the east, to set foot on Cundinamarca. The powerful German banking houses of Fugger and Welser lent moneys to Charles V in return for which the Welsers were permitted to ship their agents to Venezuela. And it was from Venezuela that one of Quesada's two rivals, the unscrupulous Nicholas Federmann, reached the Chibchas' empire a few days later than Quesada. Don Sebastián de Belalcázar, who years before had shared in the conquest of the Inca empire and founded city after city in the Andes, was the other rival who missed the chance of being the first to lay the foundations of New Granada. Quesada's southern suavity and legalistic acumen convinced the other two adventurers of the advisability of referring their claims to the authorities in Spain. Arciniegas's banter deliciously pokes fun at the tradition revered in Bogotá. "This city of mine which was shortly to receive its heraldic bearings from the mystic King Charles and the mad Queen Juana could not have had a more honorable origin. This is the way all noble cities are born. . . ."

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A Woman of Valor

HENRIETTA SZOLD: *LIFE AND LETTERS*. By Marvin Lowenthal. The Viking Press. \$3.

TODAY, at eighty-one, in the desert or on mud-clogged roads, Henrietta Szold travels from one labor commune in Palestine to another, to watch over and direct the rehabilitation of thousands of young Jewish boys and girls who have been rescued from Nazi persecution. This work, as constructive as it is dramatic, was undertaken at her suggestion in 1935 by the American women's Zionist organization, Hadasah, which she had founded in 1912 and which previously had carried out her program of medical and sanitary rehabilitation.

The daughter of a liberal Baltimore rabbi who envisaged for her a life of scholarship, Miss Szold, after a period of substantial contribution to teaching as well as to Hebrew scholarship and Jewish culture, chose work which would satisfy her desire to translate spiritual values into "practical terms." In her twenties she had added to a double teaching task the founding, direction, and active participation in a school for Russian Jewish refugees from Czarist persecution. What distinguished her from her West European contemporaries was that she was more impressed by the rich cultural values of the East Europeans than by the problems which their poverty seemed to raise for the comfortable Baltimore Jewish community. As a result, the school, which served as community center for non-Jewish immigrants as well, never failed, as did many of the contemporary settlement houses, to provide a link between the Old and the New World.

In her long career of Zionist activity in the United States and, since 1920, in her work in Palestine, her effort has been directed toward the removal of what she called the "taint of charity." It is a testimony to her understanding of the aims and values of the various factions in Jewish life that she has been accepted, as perhaps no other "middle class" American has been, by the Jewish labor groups.

Mr. Lowenthal, whose many books give proof of his knowledge of Jewish culture, has written a vivid section on the Baltimore background in his usual felicitous style. But for the major portion of the account he has relied on a generous selection of Miss Szold's letters to tell the story, adding only occasional footnotes or supplementary narrative. In the case of a person both as busy and as modest as Miss Szold, this method is not well designed to make her contribution understandable to the general public for whom this volume was intended. The quality of her spirit is made clear, and so is her courage in undertaking tasks which she had outlined for technicians and specialists but which she had to carry out herself, as acting director of the Medical Unit, as a member of the Palestine Executive during a period of economic crisis, mass immigration, and Arab-Jewish disturbances, and then as head and sole worker in the program of social service which she initiated in 1931. Little was needed to supplement her caustically correct analysis of British colonialism. But an appreciation of her emphasis on the need of Arab-Jewish rapprochement requires more background and an account of what she did in her own work to achieve that end. The same is true of the problems raised by factionalism and especially by the conflict over the aspirations and methods of

the labor groups. With such a background, a more limited selection of letters would still have conveyed her warmth and her achievement—the achievement of a woman who preferred hard work to sermonizing, but whose scrupulous laying of stone on stone never obscured her vision of the regeneration of her people as one step in the enriching of all human life.

ELSIE GLUCK

The Tewlers

YOU CAN'T BE TOO CAREFUL. By H. G. Wells, G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$2.50.

H. G. WELLS still goes his old unregenerate way. His latest novel is announced as a return to story-telling but actually it is a reformer's field-day in which the story of Edward Albert Tewler is only a pretext for Wells to range the whole of modern English life, scolding, satirizing, waving the banner for science and education. But Wells's prose is as vigorous as, at its best, it has always been and a great relief after the dreariness of most contemporary writing. And if his research into Tewler frightens us for the society that produced him, it also frightens us for Tewler himself: Wells the novelist is still capable of coming to the rescue of Wells the sociologist.

Tewler is *homo sub-sapiens* and, for Wells, pretty much the type of all modern humanity. Edward Albert, the specimen Wells is examining, is born in London at the beginning of the century and reared by a mother whose whole poor view of life is contained in the single maxim, "You can't be too careful"; by the time his mother and an England of prejudice and superstition are through with him, he is a small monument of ignorance, fear, and pointless self-assertion. He becomes a citizen of a world with which he is not equipped to cope, yet this world must look for survival to its Tewlers. And then comes the present war and Tewler has his moments of responsibility and courage; they are not to be made much of, says Wells, because at best the Tewlers act only from an animal instinct for self-preservation; and in war as in peace they act from the wrong motives, and always with a hatred of "ideers." But by this time Edward Albert is of course full-grown and whatever fictional interest Wells has had in him has been sacrificed to out-and-out political preachment. Down the political hatch, too, have gone all the subsidiary Tewlers, male and female, who enlivened the first half of the book and gave Wells the opportunity to exercise his pleasant ambition to be a modern Dickens.

It is the thing, nowadays, to consider Wells old-hat, and "You Can't Be Too Careful" certainly adds nothing new to what he has said in the past. Here he is still calling for a convocation of wise men to settle the ills of society and still inveighing against the sad influences of religion; he reminds us yet again that we are only apes, and we have a strong impulse to ask him to let bygones be bygones. But perhaps it is as much a comment on us as on him that we think Wells's "modernity" so old-fashioned. Something other than sophistication may lie behind our present-day lack of concern with the still-dangerous fundamentalisms—a weariness of spirit, maybe, to which Wells's seventy-six-year-old energy is a rebuke.

DIANA TRILLING

IN BRIEF

MR. PAN. By Emily Hahn. Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc. \$2.50.

Emily Hahn has collected twenty-eight of her Chinese conversation pieces into this one volume. The scene is Shanghai about 1937, and the talk is about Pan Heh-ven, his life and family. The author-listener endeavors to understand Pan Heh-ven, and the critical awareness of her own bewilderment is the real frame of the conversations. Because Miss Hahn's manners are excellent and her sympathy is genuine, the conversations acquire the charming ease and delightful obliquity of her Chinese subject, and permit her at the same time to retain her own integrity and inflect her general wonder into ironic comment. Some of the pieces are rather thinly connected, but now and then—as in *Sound of Metals*—there is a glimpse of profounder depths in a cold plunge beneath the conversational waters.

CLARK GIFFORD'S BODY. By Kenneth Fearing. Random House. \$2.50.

It's an uneasy world that Mr. Fearing predicts after the present war; we suspect that his Clark Gifford, leader of the so-called Committee for Action, is Mr. Fearing's John Brown of our coming period of civil strife. But nothing in this novel has enough reality either to touch or to warn us—not the people, the political parties, or the society itself. Mr. Fearing names no names; we guess his scene is America and that his abortive insurrection (it's a matter of seizing the radio stations) is scheduled for around 1956. The story is told through the eyes of a dozen or more characters and skips back and forth in time over a period of thirty years before and after the "attack"; it's a confusing technique which befuddles the reader, creates a sterile objectivity, and spares Mr. Fearing the necessity of committing himself on his own political viewpoint, if any.

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

They Burned the Books. By Stephen Vincent Benét. Farrar and Rinehart. 50 cents.

Conditions of Peace. By Edward Hallett Carr. Macmillan. \$2.50.

The Face of the War, 1931-1942. By Samuel H. Cuff. Messner. \$3.

The Earth and Man: A Human Geography. By Darrell Haug Davis. Macmillan. \$4.25.

Iron Pioneer: Henry W. Oliver, 1840-1904. By Henry Oliver Evans. Dutton. \$3.50.

Paul Revere and the World He Lived In. By Esther Forbes. Houghton Mifflin. \$3.75.

All Children Listen. By Dorothy Gordon. George W. Stewart. \$1.50.

Arise to Conquer. By Wing-Commander Ian Glead. Random House. \$2.

The Problems of Lasting Peace. By Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson. Doubleday, Doran. \$2.

Asia's Captive Colonies. By Philip E. Lilienthal and John H. Oakie. American Council Institute of Pacific Relations. 10 cents.

How to Buy More for Your Money. By Sidney Margolius. Modern Age. \$1.

Bookmaking and Kindred Amenities. Edited by Earl Schenck Miers and Richard Ellis. Rutgers. \$3.50.

British Rule in Eastern Asia: A Study of Government and Economic Development in British Malaya and Hong Kong. By Lennox A. Mills. Minnesota. \$5.

Russians Don't Surrender. By Alexander Poliakov. Dutton. \$2.50.

Prelude to Victory. By James B. Reston. Knopf. \$2.

Only the Stars Are Neutral. By Quentin Reynolds. Random House. \$2.50.

Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia's City of Steel. By John Scott. Houghton Mifflin. \$2.75.

Ambassadors in White: The Story of American Tropical Medicine. By Charles Morrow Wilson. Holt. \$3.50.

MUSIC

TO go on with what Rimsky-Korsakov did to Mussorgsky's "Boris Godunov": A painter or a poet would have known that he must not lay hands on another man's work; and if he didn't know it the world would have known it for him. But I once pointed out that people who bring to literature the understanding which permits them to be fairly discriminating about a performance of "Hamlet" bring no such understanding to a performance of Beethoven, a transcription of Bach. It was this lack of understanding that caused Rimsky-Korsakov himself to do what he did, and others then to accept what he had done: a world that would have known enough to reject a painter's or a poet's transformation of another man's painting or poem and to condemn him for it, has listened to Rimsky-Korsakov's transformation of "Boris Godunov" and accepted his justification of it.

"It must be remembered," says Carl Van Vechten in his introduction to the new edition of "My Musical Life," "that Rimsky-Korsakov meant it all for the best, that he did no more for his dead friend than he was constantly doing for himself, and that he made it possible for Mussorgsky's music drama to be performed not only in Russia but also out of it. And the logic of his an-

swer to his critics is unassailable. If, he hypothesizes, the future may decide his work on the Mussorgsky manuscripts to be an impiety, then all the future has to do is to return to the original scores, none of which he destroyed." What should be remembered, rather, is the occasional evidence that arrogance, and anger at Mussorgsky's scorn for his "Conservatory learning" and indifference to his work, also impelled Rimsky-Korsakov; that what he might do to his own music he was not privileged to do to anyone else's; that "Boris Godunov" did not require Rimsky-Korsakov's alterations in order to succeed; that with these alterations what was performed everywhere was not Mussorgsky's music drama but Rimsky-Korsakov's transformation of it; and that once this had taken root everywhere in opera houses and in people's minds it was almost im-

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possible to dislodge it for Mussorgsky's original.

As finally revised by Mussorgsky after its rejection by the committee representing the directors of the imperial theaters, "Boris" was produced at the Mariinsky Theater in St. Petersburg in 1874 "with great success," Rimsky-Korsakov tells us. It continued to be performed once or twice each year, except 1881, until 1882, when, "the Lord knows why, productions of the opera ceased altogether, although it had enjoyed uninterrupted success. . . . There were rumors afloat that the opera had displeased the imperial family; there was gossip that its subject was unpleasant to the censors." But Rimsky-Korsakov mentions no rumor of any difficulties created for performers or audience by defects in Mussorgsky's writing. And when he speaks of his revision later it is only to say how well it sounded. That was its purpose—to make the work conform to his taste.

Nor is it true that his revisions in themselves made possible performances that would not have been given without them. The truth is rather that in a situation where he could get "Boris" performed, and where someone else would have won a performance of Mussorgsky's original, Rimsky-Korsakov secured a performance of his own revision. Once out of the repertory Mussorgsky's work would have stayed out for a number of years, just as Verdi's "Othello" and Mozart's "Marriage of Figaro" were out of the Metropolitan's repertory for twenty years or so, and for the same reasons—among them the fact that the men who directed the imperial theaters were as uncompelled by greatness in art as Gatti-Casazza and Ziegler of the Metropolitan. "Othello" and "Figaro" were restored at the Metropolitan eventually, not because they were rewritten, but because Edward Johnson, who succeeded Gatti-Casazza, had ideas about the Metropolitan's repertory that included things like "Othello" and "Figaro." "Boris," too, would have been restored eventually through some similar personal intervention; and it could have been restored through Rimsky-Korsakov's intervention in 1896. In that year he accepted the chairmanship of the Society of Musical Gatherings; and "at the same time," as he puts it in a statement which betrays the capacity for concealing truth behind the show of soberly, unflinchingly telling it, "there sprang up in the Society the idea of a stage production of 'Boris Godunov' in my revision." With a different man in his

position there would have "sprung up" the idea of a production of Mussorgsky's original work. And if the intervention had been for this original, the original instead of the revision would have been produced by Mamontov's company in Moscow with Chaliapin and brought to St. Petersburg by this company in 1899; it would have come to the Mariinsky Theater with Chaliapin in 1904; it would have gone with him to Paris in 1908 in the production that carried the work to western Europe and eventually to America.

Once the revision had been established everywhere in this way instead of the original, the logic of Rimsky-Korsakov's answer might be unassailable in the world of pure thought, but in the world of action—which is to say the opera house—it was routine, inertia, lack of conscience or understanding that proved unassailable by a few critics' demonstrations of the revision's "impiety." The original score has been available since 1928; but it is still used for performances only in Russia.

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